by Tyler Durden
With Abe picking his new dovish playmate, and Draghi doing his best
to jawbone the EUR down without actually saying anything, it is becoming
very clear that no matter what level of bullshit histrionics is used by
the politicians and bankers in public, the currency wars have begun to gather pace.
Japan's more open aggressive policy intervention is the game-changer
(and increasingly fascinating how they will talk around it at the
upcoming G-20), as if a weaker JPY is an important pillar of the
strategy to make this export-oriented economy more competitive again, it
brings into the picture something that was missing from earlier
interactions among central banks of the advanced economies – competitive depreciation. The last time the world saw a fully fledged currency war was in the early 1930s. Morgan Stanley's Joachim Fels looks at what it was like and what lessons can be drawn for the sequence of events - there are definite winners and losers and a clear first-mover advantage.
Via Morgan Stanley, Back to the 1930s? What Would a Currency War Look Like?
What did the currency war of the 1930s look like?
The backdrop for the currency war of the 1930s was the Gold Standard
and the Great Depression (many economists blame the former for the
latter). By fixing the value of the currency to the price of gold, the
Gold Standard prevented a country from printing too much money. If it
did, people would simply exchange it for gold (or for other currencies
pegged to gold).
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Showing posts with label Norway. Show all posts
Showing posts with label Norway. Show all posts
Monday, February 11, 2013
Lessons From The 1930s Currency Wars
Etichette:
central banks,
China,
Debt Ceiling European Central Bank,
France,
Germany,
great depression,
Japan,
Market Share,
Mexico Morgan Stanley,
Norway,
Unemployment,
United Kingdom,
Yen
Monday, February 4, 2013
The Oslo Housing Bubble Syndrome
by Mark Thornton
The Stockholm syndrome is a psychological phenomenon whereby hostages develop irrational sympathy toward their captors even to the point of defending their captors in subsequent investigations and criminal trials. While this applies to individuals or small groups, the Oslo syndrome applies to whole national populations.
In The Oslo Syndrome: Delusions of a People under Siege (Smith and Kraus Global, 2005),Kenneth Levin describes a “psychological response common among chronically besieged populations, whether minorities subjected to defamation, discrimination and assault or small nations under persistent attack by their neighbors. People living under such stressful conditions often choose to accept at face value the indictments of their accusers in the hope of thereby escaping their predicament.”
The Stockholm syndrome is a psychological phenomenon whereby hostages develop irrational sympathy toward their captors even to the point of defending their captors in subsequent investigations and criminal trials. While this applies to individuals or small groups, the Oslo syndrome applies to whole national populations.
In The Oslo Syndrome: Delusions of a People under Siege (Smith and Kraus Global, 2005),Kenneth Levin describes a “psychological response common among chronically besieged populations, whether minorities subjected to defamation, discrimination and assault or small nations under persistent attack by their neighbors. People living under such stressful conditions often choose to accept at face value the indictments of their accusers in the hope of thereby escaping their predicament.”
Etichette:
Credit Expansion,
Federal Reserve,
Norway,
Stockholm syndrome
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