by Tyler Durden
With the first arrow of Abenomics perhaps hitting its limit, it will
be the second and third arrows that need to occur quickly and
aggressively to carry this momentum forward (and for the economy to grow
into stock valuations). Barclays lays out 15 of its most frequently
asked questions below but concerns remain as the BoJ’s planned
absorption of nearly 80% of new JGB issuance from the markets this
fiscal year has triggered a dramatic change not only in JGB
supply/demand and ownership structure but in the JGB market risk profile
itself, which has moved from “low carry, low volatility and
high liquidity (superior to other assets from perspective of
risk-adjusted returns or Sharpe ratio)” to “low carry, high volatility
and low liquidity (inferior from same perspective)”. Barclays
added that with a wave of major political and policy events ahead,
starting with a crucial Upper House election, there was no big change in
the basic belief among foreign investors that Japan is likely to be the
main source of surprise for the global economy and of volatility in
financial markets.
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Showing posts with label Yen. Show all posts
Showing posts with label Yen. Show all posts
Saturday, May 25, 2013
Sunday, May 5, 2013
A. Gary Shilling - Six Realities In An Age Of Deleveraging
by Lance Roberts of Street Talk Live blog
In Part III of Lance's series of reports from the
10th annual Strategic Investment Conference, presented Altegris
Investments and John Mauldin, the question of how to invest during a
deleveraging cycle is addressed by A. Gary Shilling, Ph.D. Dr.
Shilling is the President of A. Gary Shilling & Co., an investment
manager, Forbes and Bloomberg columnist and author - Mr. Shilling's list
of credentials is long and impressive. His most recent book "The Age Of Deleveraging: Investment Strategies In A Slow Growth Economy" is a must read. Here are his views on what to watch out for and how to invest in our current economic cycle.
Six Fundamental Realities
- Private Sector Deleveraging And Government Policy Responses
- Rising Protectionism
- Grand Disconnect Between Markets And Economy
- Zeal For Yield
- End Of Export Driven Economies
- Equities Are Vulnerable
Private Sector Deleveraging And Government Policy Responses
Household deleveraging is far from over.
There is most likely at least 5 more years to go. However, it could be
longer given the magnitude of the debt bubble. The offset of the
household deleveraging has been the leveraging up of the Federal
government.
The flip side of household leverage is
the personal saving rates. The decline in the savings rate from the
1980’s to 2000 was a major boost to economic growth. That has now
changed as savings rate are now slowly increasing and acting as a drag
on growth.
However, American’s are not saving
voluntarily. American’s have been trained to spend as long as credit is
readily available. However, credit is no longer available. Furthermore,
there is an implicit mistrust of stocks which is a huge change from the
90’s when stocks were believed to be a source of wealth creation
limiting the need to save.
Etichette:
bear market,
debasement of yen,
Federal Reserve,
Germany,
Gross Domestic Product,
Japan,
Monetary Policy,
Quantitative Easing,
trade deficit,
Yen
Monday, February 11, 2013
Lessons From The 1930s Currency Wars
by Tyler Durden
With Abe picking his new dovish playmate, and Draghi doing his best to jawbone the EUR down without actually saying anything, it is becoming very clear that no matter what level of bullshit histrionics is used by the politicians and bankers in public, the currency wars have begun to gather pace. Japan's more open aggressive policy intervention is the game-changer (and increasingly fascinating how they will talk around it at the upcoming G-20), as if a weaker JPY is an important pillar of the strategy to make this export-oriented economy more competitive again, it brings into the picture something that was missing from earlier interactions among central banks of the advanced economies – competitive depreciation. The last time the world saw a fully fledged currency war was in the early 1930s. Morgan Stanley's Joachim Fels looks at what it was like and what lessons can be drawn for the sequence of events - there are definite winners and losers and a clear first-mover advantage.
Via Morgan Stanley, Back to the 1930s? What Would a Currency War Look Like?
What did the currency war of the 1930s look like?
The backdrop for the currency war of the 1930s was the Gold Standard and the Great Depression (many economists blame the former for the latter). By fixing the value of the currency to the price of gold, the Gold Standard prevented a country from printing too much money. If it did, people would simply exchange it for gold (or for other currencies pegged to gold).
With Abe picking his new dovish playmate, and Draghi doing his best to jawbone the EUR down without actually saying anything, it is becoming very clear that no matter what level of bullshit histrionics is used by the politicians and bankers in public, the currency wars have begun to gather pace. Japan's more open aggressive policy intervention is the game-changer (and increasingly fascinating how they will talk around it at the upcoming G-20), as if a weaker JPY is an important pillar of the strategy to make this export-oriented economy more competitive again, it brings into the picture something that was missing from earlier interactions among central banks of the advanced economies – competitive depreciation. The last time the world saw a fully fledged currency war was in the early 1930s. Morgan Stanley's Joachim Fels looks at what it was like and what lessons can be drawn for the sequence of events - there are definite winners and losers and a clear first-mover advantage.
Via Morgan Stanley, Back to the 1930s? What Would a Currency War Look Like?
What did the currency war of the 1930s look like?
The backdrop for the currency war of the 1930s was the Gold Standard and the Great Depression (many economists blame the former for the latter). By fixing the value of the currency to the price of gold, the Gold Standard prevented a country from printing too much money. If it did, people would simply exchange it for gold (or for other currencies pegged to gold).
Etichette:
central banks,
China,
Debt Ceiling European Central Bank,
France,
Germany,
great depression,
Japan,
Market Share,
Mexico Morgan Stanley,
Norway,
Unemployment,
United Kingdom,
Yen
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