by mises.org
It was a scene familiar to any nostalgia buff: all-night lines waiting
for the banks (first in Ohio, then in Maryland) to open; pompous but
mendacious assurances by the bankers that all is well and that the
people should go home; a stubborn insistence by depositors to get their
money out; and the consequent closing of the banks by government, while
at the same time the banks were permitted to stay in existence and
collect the debts due them by their borrowers.
In other words, instead of government protecting private property and
enforcing voluntary contracts, it deliberately violated the property of
the depositors by barring them from retrieving their own money from the
banks.
All this was, of course, a replay of the early 1930s: the last era of
massive runs on banks. On the surface the weakness was the fact that the
failed banks were insured by private or state deposit insurance
agencies, whereas the banks that easily withstood the storm were insured
by the federal government (FDIC for commercial banks; FSLIC for savings
and loan banks).
But why? What is the magic elixir possessed by the federal government
that neither private firms nor states can muster? The defenders of the
private insurance agencies noted that they were technically in better
financial shape than FSLIC or FDIC, since they had greater reserves per
deposit dollar insured. How is it that private firms, so far superior to
government in all other operations, should be so defective in this one
area? Is there something unique about money that requires federal
control?
The answer to this puzzle lies in the anguished statements of the
savings and loan banks in Ohio and in Maryland, after the first of their
number went under because of spectacularly unsound loans. "What a
pity," they in effect complained, "that the failure of this one unsound
bank should drag the sound banks down with them!"
But in what sense is a bank "sound" when one whisper of doom, one
faltering of public confidence, should quickly bring the bank down? In
what other industry does a mere rumor or hint of doubt swiftly bring
down a mighty and seemingly solid firm? What is there about banking that
public confidence should play such a decisive and overwhelmingly
important role?
The answer lies in the nature of our banking system, in the fact that
both commercial banks and thrift banks (mutual-savings and
savings-and-loan) have been systematically engaging in
fractional-reserve banking: that is, they have far less cash on hand
than there are demand claims to cash outstanding. For commercial banks, the reserve fraction is now about 10 percent; for the thrifts it is far less.
This means that the depositor who thinks he has $10,000 in a bank is
misled; in a proportionate sense, there is only, say, $1,000 or less
there. And yet, both the checking depositor and the savings depositor
think that they can withdraw their money at any time on demand.
Obviously, such a system, which is considered fraud when practiced by
other businesses, rests on a confidence trick: that is, it can only work
so long as the bulk of depositors do not catch on to the scare and try
to get their money out. The confidence is essential, and also misguided.
That is why once the public catches on, and bank runs begin, they are
irresistible and cannot be stopped.
We now see why private enterprise works so badly in the deposit
insurance business. For private enterprise only works in a business that
is legitimate and useful, where needs are being fulfilled. It is
impossible to "insure" a firm, even less so an industry, that is
inherently insolvent. Fractional reserve banks, being inherently
insolvent, are uninsurable.
What, then, is the magic potion of the federal government? Why does
everyone trust the FDIC and FSLIC even though their reserve ratios are
lower than private agencies, and though they too have only a very small
fraction of total insured deposits in cash to stem any bank run? The
answer is really quite simple: because everyone realizes, and realizes
correctly, that only the federal government--and not the states or
private firms--can print legal tender dollars. Everyone knows that, in
case of a bank run, the U.S. Treasury would simply order the Fed to
print enough cash to bail out any depositors who want it. The Fed has
the unlimited power to print dollars, and it is this unlimited power to
inflate that stands behind the current fractional reserve banking
system.
Yes, the FDIC and FSLIC "work," but only because the unlimited monopoly
power to print money can "work" to bail out any firm or person on earth.
For it was precisely bank runs, as severe as they were that, before
1933, kept the banking system under check, and prevented any substantial
amount of inflation.
But now bank runs--at least for the overwhelming majority of banks under federal deposit insurance--are over, and we have been paying and will continue to pay the horrendous price of saving the banks: chronic and unlimited inflation.
Putting an end to inflation requires not only the abolition of the Fed
but also the abolition of the FDIC and FSLIC. At long last, banks would
be treated like any firm in any other industry. In short, if they can't
meet their contractual obligations they will be required to go under and
liquidate. It would be instructive to see how many banks would survive
if the massive governmental props were finally taken away.
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